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Abstract: We study the problem of learning-based attacks in a simple abstraction of cyber-physical
systems—the case of a scalar, discrete-time, linear, time-invariant plant that may be subject to an attack
that overrides the sensor readings and the controller actions. The attacker attempts to learn the dynamics
of the plant and subsequently override the controller’s actuation signal, to destroy the plant without
being detected. The attacker can feed fictitious sensor readings to the controller using its estimate of
the plant dynamics and mimicking the legitimate plant operation. The controller, on the other hand, is
constantly on the lookout for an attack, and immediately shuts the plant off if an attack is detected. We
study the performance of a specific authentication test and, by utilizing tools from information theory
and statistics, we bound the asymptotic detection and deception probabilities for any measurable control
policy when the attacker uses an arbitrary learning algorithm to estimate the dynamic of the plant.
Finally, we show how the controller can impede the learning process of the attacker by superimposing a
carefully crafted privacy-enhancing signal upon its control policy.
Keywords: Secure control, system identification, cyber-physical systems security, man-in-the-middle
attack, physical authentication of control systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent technological advances in wireless communications and
computation, and their integration into networked control and
cyber-physical systems (CPS), open the door to a myriad of
exciting opportunities in cloud robotics (Kehoe et al., 2015).
However, the distributed nature of CPS is often a source of
vulnerability. Security breaches in CPS can have catastrophic
consequences ranging from hampering the economy by obtain-
ing financial gain, through hijacking autonomous vehicles and
drones, and all the way to terrorism by manipulating life-critical
infrastructures (Urbina et al., 2016). Real-world instances of
security breaches in CPS, that were discovered and made avail-
able to the public, include the revenge sewage attack in Ma-
roochy Shire, Australia; the Ukraine power grid cyber-attack;
the German steel mill cyber-attack; the Davis-Besse nuclear
power plant attack in Ohio, USA; and the Iranian uranium-
enrichment facility attack via the Stuxnet malware (Sandberg
et al., 2015). Consequently, studying and preventing such se-
curity breaches via control-theoretic methods have received a
great deal of attention in recent years (Bai et al., 2017; Dolk
et al., 2017; Shoukry et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018; Shi et al.,
2018; Dibaji et al., 2018; Tunga et al., 2018).
An important and widely used class of attacks in CPS is based
on the “man-in-the-middle” (MITM) attack technique (Smith,
2011): an attacker takes over the control and sensor signals of
the physical plant. The attacker overrides the control signals
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with malicious inputs to push the plant toward a catastrophic
trajectory. Consequently, many CPS constantly monitor the
plant outputs to detect possible attacks. The attacker, on the
other hand, aims to override the sensor readings in a manner
that would be indistinguishable from the legitimate ones.
The MITM attack has been extensively studied in two special
cases (Mo et al., 2015; Zhu and Martı´nez, 2014; Miao et al.,
2013; Satchidanandan and Kumar, 2017; Smith, 2011). The first
case is the replay attack, in which the attacker observes and
records the legitimate system behavior for a given time window
and then replays this recording periodically at the controller’s
input (Mo et al., 2015; Zhu and Martı´nez, 2014; Miao et al.,
2013). The second case is the statistical-duplicate attack, which
assumes that the attacker has acquired complete knowledge of
the dynamics and parameters of the system, and can construct
arbitrarily long fictitious sensor readings that are statistically
identical to the actual signals (Satchidanandan and Kumar,
2017; Smith, 2011). The replay attack assumes no knowledge
of the system parameters—and as a consequence, it is rela-
tively easy to detect it. An effective way to counter the replay
attack consists of superimposing a random watermark signal,
unknown to the attacker, on top of the control signal (Fang
et al., 2017; Hespanhol et al., 2018). The statistical-duplicate
attack assumes full knowledge of the system dynamics—and
as a consequence, it requires a more sophisticated detection
procedure, as well as additional assumptions on the attacker
or controller behavior to ensure it can be detected. To combat
the attacker’s full knowledge, the controller may adopt moving
target (Weerakkody and Sinopoli, 2015) or baiting (Flamholz
et al., 2019; Hoehn and Zhang, 2016) techniques. Alternatively,
the controller may introduce private randomness in the control
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(a) Learning: During this phase, the attacker eavesdrops and learns the system,
without altering the input signal to the controller (Yk = Xk).
(b) Hijacking: During this phase, the attacker hijacks the system and intervenes
as a MITM in two places: acting as a fake plant for the controller (Yk = Vk)
by impersonating the legitimate sensor, and as a malicious controller (U˜k) for
the plant aiming to destroy the plant.
Fig. 1. System model during learning-based attack phases.
input using watermarking (Satchidanandan and Kumar, 2017).
In this scenario, a vital assumption is made: although the at-
tacker observes the true sensor readings, it is barred from ob-
serving the control actions, as otherwise it would be omniscient
and undetectable.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we observe that in many
practical situations, the attacker does not have full knowledge of
the system and cannot simulate a statistically indistinguishable
copy of the system. On the other hand, the attacker can carry out
more sophisticated attacks than simply replaying the previous
sensor readings, by attempting to “learn” the system dynamics
from the observations. For this reason, we study learning-based
attacks and show that they can outperform replay attacks by
analyzing the performance using a specific learning algorithm.
Second, we derive asymptotic bounds on the detection and
deception probabilities for any (measurable) control policy
when the attacker uses any arbitrary learning algorithm to
estimate the dynamics of the plant. Third, for any learning
algorithm utilized by the attacker to estimate the dynamics of
the plant, we show that adding a proper privacy-enhancing
signal to any measurable control policy provides enhanced
guarantees on the detection probability.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the attacker has full
access to both sensor and control signals. The controller, on the
other hand, has perfect knowledge of the system dynamics and
tries to discover the attack from the injected observations. The
assumed information-pattern imbalance between the controller
and the attacker is justified since the controller is tuned in
much longer than the attacker and thus has knowledge of the
system dynamics to a far greater precision than the attacker.
While our analysis is restricted to linear scalar systems, it is
natural to extend this framework and develop parallel results
for multivariate and nonlinear systems. Finally, studying the
relation between our privacy-enhancing signal with the noise
utilized to achieve differential privacy (Corte´s et al., 2016) is
also an interesting future research venue.
The proofs of all the results appear in the appendix.
1.1 Notation
We denote by N the set of natural numbers. All logarithms,
denoted by log, are to base 2. For two real valued func-
tions g and h, g(x) = O (h(x)) as x → x0 means
limx→x0 |g(x)/h(x)| < ∞, and g(x) = o (h(x)) as x →
x0 means limx→x0 |g(x)/h(x)| = 0. We denote by xji =
(xi, · · · , xj) the realization of the random vector Xji =
(Xi, · · · , Xj) for i, j ∈ N, i ≤ j. ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean
norm. PX denotes the distribution of the random variable
X with respect to (w.r.t) probability measure P, whereas fX
denotes its probability density function (PDF) w.r.t. to the
Lebesgue measure, if it has one. An event happens almost
surely (a.s.) if it occurs with probability one. For real numbers
a and b, a b means a is much less than b, in some numerical
sense, while for probability distributions P and Q, P  Q
means P is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Q. dP/dQ denotes the
Radon–Nikodym derivative of Pw.r.t.Q. The Kullback–Leibler
(KL) divergence between probability distributions PX and PY
is defined as
D(PX‖PY ) ,
EPX
[
log
dPX
dPY
]
, PX  PY ;
∞, otherwise,
where EPX denotes the expectation w.r.t. probability mea-
sure PX . The conditional KL divergence between probability
distributions PY |X and QY |X averaged over PX is defined
as D
(
PX|Y
∥∥QY |X ∣∣PX) , EPX˜ [D (PY |X=X˜∥∥∥QY |X=X˜)],
where (X, X˜) are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.). The mutual information between random variables
X and Y is defined as I(X;Y ) , D (PXY ‖PXPY ). The
conditional mutual information between random variables X
and Y given random variable Z is defined as I(X;Y |Z) ,
EPZ˜
[
I(X;Y |Z = Z˜)
]
, where (Z, Z˜) are i.i.d.
2. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider the networked control system depicted in Fig. 1,
where the plant dynamics are described by a scalar, discrete-
time, linear time-invariant (LTI) system
Xk+1 = aXk + Uk +Wk, (1)
where Xk, a, Uk, Wk are real numbers representing the plant
state, open-loop gain of the plant, control input, and plant
disturbance, respectively, at time k ∈ N. The controller, at time
k, observes Yk and generates a control signal Uk as a function
of Y k1 . We assume that the initial condition X0 has a known (to
all parties) distribution and is independent of the disturbance
sequence {Wk}. For analytical purposes, we assume {Wk} is
an i.i.d. Gaussian process N (0, σ2) known to all parties. We
assume that U0 = W0 = 0. Moreover, to simplify the notation,
let Zk , (Xk, Uk) denote the state-and-control input at time k
and its trajectory up to time k—by
Zk1 , (Xk1 , Uk1 ).
The controller is equipped with a detector that tests for anoma-
lies in the observed history Y k1 . When the controller detects an
attack, it shuts the system down and prevents the attacker from
causing further “damage” to the plant. The controller/detector
is aware of the plant dynamics (1) and knows the open-loop
gain a of the plant. On the other hand, the attacker knows the
plant dynamics (1) as well as the plant state Xk, and control
input Uk (or equivalently, Zk) at time k (see Fig. 1). However,
it does not know the open-loop gain a of the plant.
In what follows, it will be convenient to treat the open-loop
gain of the plant as a random variable A that is fixed in time,
whose PDF fA is known to the attacker, and whose realization
a is known to the controller. We assume all random variables to
exist on a common probability space with probability measure
P, and Uk to be a measurable function of Y k1 for all time k ∈ N.
We also denote the probability measure conditioned on A = a
by Pa. Namely, for any measurable event C, we define
Pa(C) = P(C|A = a).
A is further assumed to be independent ofX0 and {Wk|k ∈ N}.
2.1 Learning-based attacks
We define Learning-based attacks that consist of two disjoint,
consecutive, passive and active phases, as follows.
Phase 1: Learning. During this phase, the attacker passively
observes the control input and the plant state to learn the open-
loop gain of the plant. As illustrated in Fig. 1a, for all k ∈ [0, L],
the attacker observes the control input Uk and the plant state
Xk, and tries to learn the open-loop gain a, where L is the
duration of the learning phase. We denote by Aˆ the attacker’s
estimate of the open-loop gain a. •
Phase 2: Hijacking. In this phase, the attacker aims to destroy
the plant using U˜k while remaining undetected. As illustrated
in Fig. 1b, from time L+1 and onwards the attacker hijacks the
system and feeds a malicious control signal to the plant U˜k and
a fictitious sensor reading Yk = Vk to the controller. •
We assume that the attacker can use any arbitrary learning
algorithm to estimate the open-loop gain a during the learning
phase, and upon estimation is completed, we assume that during
the hijacking phase the fictitious sensor reading is constructed
in the following way
Vk+1 = AˆVk + Uk + W˜k , k = L, . . . , T − 1, (2)
where W˜k for k = L, . . . , T − 1 are i.i.d. Gaussian N (0, σ2);
Uk is the control signal generated by the controller, which is fed
with the fictitious virtual signal Vk by the attacker; VL = XL;
and Aˆ is the estimate of the open-loop gain of the plant at the
conclusion of Phase 1.
2.2 Detection
The controller/detector, being aware of the dynamic (1) and
the open-loop gain a, attempts to detect possible attacks by
testing for statistical deviations from the typical behavior of the
system (1). More precisely, under legitimate system operation
(corresponding to the null hypothesis), the controller observa-
tion Yk behaves according to
Yk+1 − aYk − Uk(Y k1 ) ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ2). (3)
In case of an attack, during Phase 2 (k > L), (3) can be
rewritten as
Vk+1 − aVk − Uk(Y k1 )
= Vk+1 − aVk + AˆVk − AˆVk − Uk(Y k1 ) (4a)
= W˜k +
(
Aˆ− a
)
Vk, (4b)
where (4b) follows from (2). Hence, the estimation error (Aˆ−a)
dictates the ease with which an attack can be detected.
Since the Gaussian PDF with zero mean is fully characterized
by its variance, we shall test for anomalies in the latter, i.e.,
test whether the empirical variance of (3) is equal to the second
moment of the plant disturbance E
[
W 2
]
. To that end, we shall
use a test that sets a confidence interval of length 2δ > 0 around
the expected variance, i.e., it checks whether
1
T
T∑
k=1
[
Yk+1 − aYk − Uk(Y k1 )
]2
∈ (Var [W ]− δ,Var [W ] + δ),
(5)
where T is called the test time. That is, as is implied by
(4), the attacker manages to deceive the controller and remain
undetected if
1
T
(∑L
k=1W
2
k +
∑T
k=L+1(W˜k + (Aˆ− a)Vk)2
)
∈ (Var [W ]− δ,Var [W ] + δ).
2.3 Performance Measures
Definition 1. The hijack indicator at test time T is defined as
ΘT ,
{
0, ∀j ≤ T : Yj = Xj ;
1, otherwise.
At the test time T , the controller uses Y T1 to construct an
estimate ΘˆT of ΘT . More precisely, ΘˆT = 0 if (5) occurs,
otherwise ΘˆT = 1. •
Definition 2. The probability of deception is the probability of
the attacker deceiving the controller and remain undetected at
the time instance T
P a,TDec , Pa
(
ΘˆT = 0
∣∣∣ΘT = 1) . (6)
In addition, the detection probability at test time T is defined as
P a,TDet , 1− P a,TDec .
Likewise, the probability of false alarm is the probability of
detecting the attacker when it is not present, namely
P a,TFA , Pa
(
ΘˆT = 1
∣∣∣ΘT = 0) . •
In this case, using Chebyshev’s inequality, (5), since the system
disturbances are i.i.d. Gaussian N (0, σ2), we have
PTFA ≤
Var[W 2]
δ2T
=
3σ4
δ2T
.
We further define the deception, detection, and false alarm
probabilities w.r.t. the probability measure P, without condi-
tioning on A, and denote them by PTDec, P
T
Det, and P
T
FA, respec-
tively. For instance, PTDet is defined, w.r.t. a PDF fA of A, as
PTDet , P
(
ΘˆT = 1
∣∣∣ΘT = 1) = ∫∞−∞ P a,TDet fA(a)da (7)
3. STATEMENT OF THE RESULTS
In this section, we describe the main results of this work. We
want to provide lower and upper bounds on the deception
probability (6) of the learning-based attack (2) where Aˆ in
(2) is constructed using any arbitrary learning algorithm. In
addition, our results are valid for any measurable control policy
Uk. We find a lower bound on the deception probability by
characterizing what attacker can at least achieve using a least-
squares (LS) algorithm, and we derive an information theoretic
upper bound using Fano’s inequality (Polyanskiy and Wu,
2016). While our analysis is restricted to the asymptotic case,
T → ∞, it is straightforward to extend this treatment to the
non-asymptotic case.
For analytical purposes, we assume that the power of the
fictitious sensor reading is equal to β−1 <∞, namely
limT→∞
1
T
T∑
k=L+1
V 2k = 1/β a.s. w.r.t. Pa. (8)
Remark 3. Assuming the control policy is memoryless, namely
Uk is only dependent on Yk, the process Vk is Markov for
k ≥ L + 1. By further assuming that L = o(T ) and using
the generalization of the law of large numbers for Markov
processes (Durrett, 2010), we deduce
limT→∞
1
T
T∑
k=L+1
V 2k ≥ Var [W ] a.s. w.r.t. Pa.
Consequently, in this case we have β ≤ 1/Var [W ]. In addition,
when the control policy is linear and stabilizes (2), that is
Uk = −ΩYk and |Aˆ − Ω| < 1, it is easy to verify that (8)
holds true for β = (1− (Aˆ− Ω)2)/Var [W ]. •
3.1 Lower Bound on the Deception Probability
To provide a lower bound on the deception probability P a,TDec ,
we consider a specific estimate of Aˆ at the conclusion of the
first phase by the attacker. To this end, we use LS estimation
due to its efficiency and amenability to recursive update over
observed incremental data (Rantzer, 2018; Tu and Recht, 2018;
Sarkar and Rakhlin, 2019). The LS algorithm approximates the
overdetermined system of equations
X2
X3
...
XL
 = A

X1
X2
...
XL−1
+

U1
U2
...
UL−1
 ,
by minimizing the Euclidean distance Aˆ = argminA‖Xk+1 −AXk − Uk‖ to estimate (or “identify”) the plant, the
solution to which is
Aˆ =
∑L−1
k=1 (Xk+1 − Uk)Xk∑L−1
k=1 X
2
k
a.s. w.r.t. Pa. (9)
Remark 4. Since we assumed Wk ∼ N (0, σ2) for all k ∈ N,
Pa(Xk = 0) = 0. Thus, (9) is well-defined. •
Using LS estimation (9), our linear learning-based attack (2)
achieves at least the asymptotic deception probability stated in
the following theorem, for any measurable control policy.
Theorem 5. Consider any linear learning-based attack (2) with
fictitious sensor reading power that satisfies (8) and an arbitrary
measurable control policy {Uk}. Then, the asymptotic decep-
tion probability, when using the variance test (5), is bounded
from below as
limT→∞ P
a,T
Dec = Pa
(
|Aˆ− a| <
√
δβ
)
(10a)
≥ Pa

∣∣∣∑L−1k=1 WkXk∣∣∣∑L−1
k=1 X
2
k
<
√
δβ
 (10b)
Fig. 2. The attacker’s success rate P a,TDec versus the size of the
detection window T .
≥ 1− 2
(1 + δβ)L/2
. (10c)
Example 6. In this example, we compare the empirical perfor-
mance of the variance-test with our developed bound in Thm. 5.
At every time T , the controller tests the empirical variance for
abnormalities over a detection window [1, T ], using a confi-
dence interval 2δ > 0 around the expected variance (5). Here,
a = 1, δ = 0.1, Uk = −0.88aYk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ 800,
and {Wk} are i.i.d. Gaussian N (0, 1), and 500 Monte Carlo
simulations were performed.
The learning-based attacker (2) uses the LS algorithm (9) to
estimate a, and as illustrated in Fig. 2, the attacker’s success
rate increases as the duration of learning phase L increases.
This is in agreement with (10c) since the attacker can improve
its estimate of a and the estimation error |Aˆ − a| reduces
as L increases. As discussed in Sec. 2.3, the false alarm rate
decays to zero as the size of the detection window T tends
to infinity. Hence, for a sufficiently large detection window
size, the attacker’s success rate could potentially tend to one.
Indeed, such behavior is observed in Fig. 2 for a learning-based
attacker (2) with L = 400.
Also, Fig. 2 illustrates that our learning-based attack outper-
forms the replay attack. A replay attack with a recording length
of L = 20 and a learning-based attack with a learning phase
of length L = 20 are compared, and the success rate of the
replay attack saturates at a lower value. Moreover, a learning-
based attack with a learning phase of length L = 8 has a higher
success rate than a replay attack with a larger recording length
of L = 20. •
3.2 Upper Bound on the Deception Probability
We now derive an upper bound on the deception probability (6)
of any learning-based attack (2) where Aˆ in (2) is constructed
using any arbitrary learning algorithm, for any measurable
control policy, when A is distributed over a symmetric interval
[−R,R]. Similar results can be obtained for other interval
choices. Since the uniform distribution has the highest entropy
among all distributions with finite support (Polyanskiy and Wu,
2016), we further assume A is distributed uniformly over the
interval [−R,R]. We assume the attacker knows the distribution
of A (including the value of R), whereas the controller knows
the true value of A (as before).
Theorem 7. Let A be distributed uniformly over [−R,R] for
someR > 0, and consider any measurable control policy {Uk}
Fig. 3. Comparison of the lower and upper bounds on the
deception probability, of Thm. 5 and Corol. 9, respectively.
and any learning-based attack (2) with fictitious sensor reading
power (8) that satisfies
√
δβ ≤ R. Then, the asymptotic decep-
tion probability, when using the variance test (5), is bounded
from above as
limT→∞ PTDec = P(|A− Aˆ| <
√
δβ) (11a)
≤ Λ , I(A;Z
L
1 ) + 1
log(R/
√
δβ)
. (11b)
In addition, if for all k ∈ {1, . . . , L}, A → (Xk, Zk−11 ) →
Uk is a Markov chain, then for any sequence of probabil-
ity measures {QXk|Zk−11 }, such that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , L}
PXk|Zk−11  QXk|Zk−11 , we have
Λ ≤
∑L
k=1D
(
PXk|Zk−11 ,A
∥∥∥QXk|Zk−11 ∣∣∣PZk−11 ,A)+ 1
log
(
R/
√
δβ
) . (12)
Remark 8. By looking at the numerator in (11b), it follows that
the bound on the deception probability becomes looser as the
amount of information revealed about the open-loop gain A by
the observation ZL1 increases. On the other hand, by looking
at the denominator, the bound becomes tighter as R increases.
This is consistent with the observation of Zames (Raginsky,
2010) that system identification becomes harder as the uncer-
tainty about the open-loop gain of the plant increases. In our
case, a larger uncertainty interval R corresponds to a poorer es-
timation ofA by the attacker, which leads, in turn, to a decrease
in the achievable deception probability. The denominator can
also, be interpreted as the intrinsic uncertainty of A when it is
observed at resolution
√
δβ, as it corresponds to the entropy of
the random variable A when it is quantized at such resolution.•
In conclusion, Thm. 7 provides two upper bounds on the de-
ception probability. The first bound (11b) clearly shows that
increasing the privacy of the open-loop gain A—manifested in
the mutual information between A and the state-and-control
trajectory ZL1 during the exploration phase—reduces the de-
ception probability. The second bound (12) allows freedom in
choosing the auxiliary probability measure QXk|Zk−11 , making
it a rather useful bound. For instance, by choosingQXk|Zk−11 ∼
N (0, σ2), for all k ∈ N, we can rewrite the upper bound (12)
in term of EP
[
(AXk−1 + Uk−1)2
]
as follows.
Corollary 9. Under the assumptions of Thm. 7, if for all k ∈
{1, . . . , L}, A → (Xk, Zk−11 ) → Uk is a Markov chain, then
asymptotic deception probability is bounded from above by
Fig. 4. The attacker’s success rate P a,TDec versus the duration of
the exploration phase L.
lim
T→∞
PTDec ≤ G(ZL1 ), (13a)
G(ZL1 ) ,
log e
2σ2
∑L
k=1 EP
[
(AXk−1 + Uk−1)2
]
+ 1
log
(
R/
√
δβ
) . (13b)
Example 10. Thm. 5 provides a lower bound on the deception
probability given A = a. Hence, by applying the law of total
probability w.r.t. the PDF fA of A as in (7), we can apply the
result of Thm. 5 to provide a lower bound also on the average
deception probability for a random open-loop gain A. In this
context, Fig. 3 compares the lower and upper bounds on the
deception probability provided by Thm. 5, max{0, 1− (2/(1 +
δβ)L/2)}, and Corol. 9, min{1, G(ZL1 )}, respectively, where
A is distributed uniformly over [−0.9, 0.9]. (13a) is valid when
the control input is not a function of random variable A; hence,
we assumed Uk = −0.045Yk for all time k ∈ N. Here δ = 0.1,
{Wk} are i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and variance of 0.16,
and for simplicity, we let β = 1.1. Although, in general,
the attacker’s estimation of the random open-loop gain A and
consequently the power of fictitious senor reading (8) vary
based on the learning algorithm and the realization of A, the
comparison of the lower and upper bounds in Fig. 3 is restricted
to a fixed β. 2000 Monte Carlo simulations were performed.
3.3 Privacy-enhancing signal
For a given duration of learning phase L, to increase the
security of the system, at any time k the controller can add
a privacy-enhancing signal Γk to an unauthenticated control
policy {U¯k|k ∈ N}:
Uk = U¯k + Γk , k ∈ N. (14)
We refer to such a control policy Uk as the authenticated
control policy U¯k. We denote the states of the system that would
be generated if only the unauthenticated control signal U¯k1
were applied by X¯k1 , and the resulting trajectory—by Z¯
k
1 ,
(X¯k1 , U¯
k
1 ).
The following numerical example illustrates the effect of the
privacy-enhancing signal on the deception probability.
Example 11. Here, the attacker uses the LS algorithm (9), the
detector uses the variance test (5), a = 1, T = 600, δ = 0.1,
and {Wk} are i.i.d. Gaussian N (0, 1). Fig. 4 compares the
attacker’s success rate, the empirical P a,TDec , as a function of
the duration L of the learning phase for three different control
policies: I) unauthenticated control signal U¯k1 = −aYk for
all k, II) authenticated control signal (14), where Γk are i.i.d.
Gaussian N (0, 9), III) authenticated control signal (14), where
Γk are i.i.d. Gaussian N (0, 16). As illustrated in Fig. 4, for the
authenticated and unauthenticated control signals, the attacker’s
success rate increases as the duration of the learning phase
increases. This is in agreement with (10c) since the attacker
can improve its estimate of a as L increases. Also, for a
fix L the attacker performance deteriorates as the power of
privacy-enhancing signal Γk increases. Namely, Γk hampers
the learning process of the attacker and the estimation error
|Aˆ − a| increases as the power of privacy-enhancing signal
increases. 500 Monte Carlo simulations were performed. •
Remark 12. A “good” privacy-enhancing signal entails little
increase in the control cost (Bertsekas, 1995) compared to its
unauthenticated version while providing enhanced detection
probability (6) and/or false alarm probability. Finding the opti-
mal privacy-enhancing signal is an interesting research venue.•
One may envisage that superimposing any noisy signal Γk
on top of the control policy {U¯k|k ∈ N} would necessarily
enhance the detectability of any learning-based attack (2) since
the observations of the attacker are in this case noisier. How-
ever, it turns out that injecting a strong noise for some learning
algorithm may speed up the learning process as it improves
the power of the signal magnified by the open-loop gains with
respect to the observed noise. Any signal Γk that satisfies the
condition proposed in the following corollary will provide en-
hanced guarantees on the detection probability when the at-
tacker uses any arbitrary learning algorithm to estimate the
uniformly distributed A over the symmetric interval [−R,R].
Corollary 13. For any control policy {U¯k|k ∈ N} with tra-
jectory Z¯k1 = (X¯
k
1 , U¯
k
1 ) and its corresponding authenticated
control policy Uk1 (14) with trajectory Z
k
1 = (X
k
1 , U
k
1 ), under
the assumptions of Corollary 9, if for all k ∈ {2, . . . , L}
EP
[
Ψ2k−1 + 2Ψk−1(AX¯k−1 + U¯k−1)
]
< 0, (15)
where Ψk−1 ,
∑k−1
j=1 A
k−1−jΓj , for any L ≥ 2, the following
majorization of G (13b) holds:
G(ZL1 ) < G(Z¯
L
1 ). (16)
Example 14. In this example, we describe a class of privacy-
enhancing signal that yield better guarantees on the decep-
tion probability. For all k ∈ {2, . . . , L}, clearly Ψk−1 =
−(AXk−1 + Uk−1)/η satisfies the condition in (15) for any
η ∈ {2, . . . , L}. Thus, by choosing the privacy-enhancing sig-
nals Γ1 = −(AX1 + U1)/η, and Γk = −(AXk + Uk)/η −∑k−2
j=1 A
k−1−jΓj for all k ∈ {3, . . . , L}, (16) holds. •
4. FUTURE WORK
Future work will explore the extension of the established results
to the vector (possibly partially observable) case, designing
optimal privacy-enhancing signals, and investigating the more
realistic scenario where neither the attacker nor the controller
are aware of the open-loop gain of the plant.
Appendix A. PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We break the proof of Thm. 5 into several lemmas that are stated
and proved next.
In the case of any learning-based attack (2), in the limit of
T → ∞, the empirical variance, which is used in the variance
test (5), can be expressed in terms of the estimation error of the
open-loop gain as follows.
Lemma 15. Consider any learning-based attack (2) with ficti-
tious sensor reading power that satisfies (8) and some measur-
able control policy {Uk}. Then, the variance test (5) reduces
to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
(Yk+1 − aYk − Uk(Y k1 ))2 =
Var [W ] +
(Aˆ− a)2
β
a.s. w.r.t. Pa.
Proof. Since the hijacking phase of a learning-based attack (2)
starts at time k = L+ 1, using (1) and (4) we have
1
T
T∑
k=1
(Yk+1 − aYk − Uk(Y k1 ))2
=
1
T
(
L∑
k=1
W 2k +
T∑
k=L+1
(W˜k + (Aˆ− a)Vk)2
)
(A.1a)
=
1
T
(
L∑
k=1
W 2k +
T∑
k=L+1
W˜ 2k
)
+
(Aˆ− a)2
T
T∑
k=L+1
V 2k +
2(Aˆ− a)
T
T∑
k=L+1
W˜kVk . (A.1b)
Using (Lai and Wei, 1982, Lemma2, part iii) the last term in
(A.1b) reduces to
T∑
k=L+1
W˜kVk = o
(
T∑
k=L+1
V 2k
)
+O(1) a.s.
in the limit T →∞.
Note further that
lim
T→∞
1
T
(
L∑
k=1
W 2k +
T∑
k=L+1
W˜ 2k
)
= Var [W ] a.s. (A.2)
by the strong law of large numbers (Durrett, 2010).
Substituting (8) in (A.1), and (A.2) in (A.1) and taking T to
infinity concludes the proof of the lemma. •
In the following lemma, we prove (10a) for any learning-based
attack (2), and any measurable control policy.
Lemma 16. Consider any learning-based attack (2) with ficti-
tious sensor reading power that satisfies (8) and a measurable
control policy {Uk}. Then, the asymptotic deception probabil-
ity, under the variance test (5), is equal to
lim
T→∞
P a,TDec = Pa
(
|Aˆ− a| <
√
δβ
)
.
Proof. Under the variance test,
lim
T→∞
P a,TDec = lim
T→∞
EPa [1T ] ,
where 1T is one if (5) occurs and zero otherwise. Using the
dominated convergence theorem (Durrett, 2010) and Lem. 15,
we deduce
lim
T→∞
P a,TDec = EPa [1
′
T ] ,
where 1′T is one if
Var [W ] +
(Aˆ− a)2
β
∈ (Var [W ]− δ,Var [W ] + δ)
and zero otherwise. Consequently,
lim
T→∞
P a,TDec = Pa
(
(Aˆ− a)2 ∈ (−δβ, δβ)
)
,
and the result follows. •
Clearly, the estimation error of the LS algorithm (9) is (Rantzer,
2018)
Aˆ− a =
∑L−1
k=1 WkXk∑L−1
k=1 X
2
k
a.s. w.r.t. Pa
Consequently, by (10a), learning-based attack (2) can at least
achieve the asymptotic deception probability (10b). Finally,
since, for k ∈ {1, . . . , L}, Uk is a measurable function of
Y k1 = X
k
1 , (10c) follows using Theorem 4 of (Rantzer, 2018).
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We start by proving (11a). Using Lem. 16 and (7) we deduce
lim
T→∞
PTDec =
1
2R
∫ R
−R
Pa
(
|Aˆ− a| <
√
δβ
)
da
=
1
2R
∫ R
−R
EPa [1c] da,
where 1c is one if |Aˆ − a| <
√
δβ and zero otherwise. Con-
sequently, using Tonelli’s theorem (Durrett, 2010) it follows
that
lim
T→∞
PTDec = P(|A− Aˆ| <
√
δβ). (B.1)
We now continue by proving (11b). Since the attacker observed
the plant state and control input during the learning phase which
lasts L time steps, and since A → (XL1 , UL1 ) → Aˆ constitutes
a Markov chain, using the continuous domain version of Fano’s
inequality (Duchi and Wainwright, 2013, Prop. 2), we have
inf
Aˆ
P
(∣∣∣A− Aˆ∣∣∣ ≥√δβ) ≥ 1− I(A;ZL1 ) + 1
log(R/
√
δβ)
, (B.2)
whenever
√
δβ ≤ R. Finally, using (B.1), (B.2), (11b) follows.
To prove (12), we further bound I(A;ZL1 ) from above via KL
divergence manipulations. The proof of the following lemma
follows the arguments of (Raginsky, 2010), and is detailed here
for completeness.
Lemma 17. Assume the following Markov chain A →
(Xk, Z
k−1
1 ) → Uk all k ∈ {1, . . . , L}. Let
{
QXk|Zk−11
}
be
a sequence of probability measures satisfying PXk|Zk−11 
QXk|Zk−11 for all k. Then, for all k, we have
I(A;Zk1 ) =
L∑
k=1
I(A;Xk|Zk−11 )
≤
L∑
k=1
D
(
PXk|Zk−11 ,A
∥∥∥QXk|Zk−11 ∣∣∣PZk−11 ,A) .
Proof. We start by applying the chain rule for mutual informa-
tion to I
(
A;ZL1
)
as follows.
I(A;ZL1 ) =
L∑
k=1
I
(
A;Zk
∣∣Zk−11 ) . (B.3)
We next bound I
(
A;Zk
∣∣Zk−11 ) from above.
I
(
A;Zk
∣∣Zk−11 ) = I (A;Xk, Uk∣∣Zk−11 ) (B.4a)
= I
(
A;Xk
∣∣Zk−11 ) (B.4b)
= D
(
PXk|Zk−11 ,A
∥∥∥PXk|Zk−11 ∣∣∣PZk−11 ,A) (B.4c)
= EP
[
log
dPXk|Zk−11 ,A
dPXk|Zk−11
]
(B.4d)
= EP
[
log
dPXk|Zk−11 ,A
dQXk|Zk−11
]
− EP
[
log
dPXk|Zk−11
dQXk|Zk−11
]
(B.4e)
≤ D(PXk|Zk−11 ,A‖QXk|Zk−11 |PZk−11 ,A), (B.4f)
where we substitute the definition ofZk , (Xk, Uk) to arrive at
(B.4a), (B.4b) follows from the chain rule for mutual informa-
tion and the Markovity assumption A → (Xk, Zk−11 ) → Uk,
we use the definition of the conditional mutual information
in terms of the conditional KL divergence (recall the notation
section) to attain (B.4c) and (B.4d), the manipulation in (B.4e)
is valid due to the condition PXk|Zk−11  QXk|Zk−11 in the
setup of the lemma, and (B.4f) follows from the non-negativity
property of the KL divergence.
Substituting (B.4) in (B.3) concludes the proof. •
Applying the bound of Lem. 17 to the first bound of the theo-
rem (11b) proves the second bound of the theorem (12).
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Set QXk|Zk−11 ∼ N (0, σ
2). Then, PXk|Zk−11 ,A = N (AXk−1 +
Uk−1, σ2), and consequently the measure-domination condi-
tion PXk|Zk−11  QXk|Zk−11 holds.
D(PXk|Zk−11 ,A‖QXk|Zk−11 |PZk−11 ,A) (C.1)
= EP
[
D
(N (AXk−1 + Uk−1, σ2)∥∥N (0, σ2))]
=
log e
2σ2
EP
[
(AXk−1 + Uk−1)2
]
.
The result follows by combining (12) and (C.1).
Appendix D. PROOF OF COROLLARY 13
Using (1) and (14), we can rewrite X¯k and Xk explicitly as
follows
X¯k = A
kX0 +
k−1∑
j=1
Ak−1−j(U¯j +Wj),
Xk = A
kX0 +
k−1∑
j=1
Ak−1−j(Uj +Wj)
= AkX0 +
k−1∑
j=1
Ak−1−j(U¯j + Γj +Wj)
= X¯k + Ψk−1 .
Thus, by (1), the following relation holds
AXk−1 + Uk−1 = AX¯k−1 + U¯k−1 + Ψk−1 . (D.1)
By comparing
G(Z¯L1 ) ,
log e
2σ2
∑L
k=1 EP
[
(AX¯k−1 + U¯k−1)2
]
+ 1
log
(
R/
√
δβ
) ,
with
G(ZL1 ) =
log e
2σ2
∑L
k=1 EP
[
(AX¯k−1 + U¯k−1 + Ψk−1)2
]
+ 1
log
(
R/
√
δβ
) ,
in which we have utilized (D.1), and provided (15), we arrive at
G(Z¯L1 ) > G(Z
L
1 ).
REFERENCES
Bai, C.Z., Pasqualetti, F., and Gupta, V. (2017). Data-injection
attacks in stochastic control systems: Detectability and per-
formance tradeoffs. Automatica, 82, 251–260.
Bertsekas, D.P. (1995). Dynamic programming and optimal
control, volume 1. Athena scientific Belmont, MA.
Chen, Y., Kar, S., and Moura, J.M. (2018). Cyber-physical
attacks with control objectives. IEEE Tran. Auto. Cont.,
63(5), 1418–1425.
Corte´s, J., Dullerud, G.E., Han, S., Le Ny, J., Mitra, S., and
Pappas, G.J. (2016). Differential privacy in control and
network systems. In 2016 IEEE Conf. Decision and Cont.
(CDC), 4252–4272.
Dibaji, S., Pirani, M., Annaswamy, A., Johansson, K.H., and
Chakrabortty, A. (2018). Secure control of wide-area power
systems: Confidentiality and integrity threats. In 2018 IEEE
Conf. Decision and Cont. (CDC), 7269–7274.
Dolk, V., Tesi, P., De Persis, C., and Heemels, W. (2017). Event-
triggered control systems under denial-of-service attacks.
IEEE Tran. Cont. Net. Sys., 4(1), 93–105.
Duchi, J.C. and Wainwright, M.J. (2013). Distance-based and
continuum fano inequalities with applications to statistical
estimation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1311.2669.
Durrett, R. (2010). Probability: theory and examples. Cam-
bridge university press.
Fang, C., Qi, Y., Cheng, P., and Zheng, W.X. (2017). Cost-
effective watermark based detector for replay attacks on
cyber-physical systems. In 2017 Asian Cont. Conf. (ASCC),
940–945. IEEE.
Flamholz, D.B., Annaswamy, A.M., and Lavretsky, E. (2019).
Baiting for defense against stealthy attacks on cyber-physical
systems. In AIAA Scitech 2019 Forum, 2338.
Hespanhol, P., Porter, M., Vasudevan, R., and Aswani, A.
(2018). Statistical watermarking for networked control sys-
tems. In 2018 American Cont. Conf. (ACC), 5467–5472.
IEEE.
Hoehn, A. and Zhang, P. (2016). Detection of covert attacks and
zero dynamics attacks in cyber-physical systems. In 2016
American Cont. Conf. (ACC), 302–307. IEEE.
Kehoe, B., Patil, S., Abbeel, P., and Goldberg, K. (2015). A
survey of research on cloud robotics and automation. IEEE
Tran. on auto. science and eng., 12(2), 398–409.
Lai, T.L. and Wei, C.Z. (1982). Least squares estimates in
stochastic regression models with applications to identifica-
tion and control of dynamic systems. The Annals of Statis-
tics, 154–166.
Miao, F., Pajic, M., and Pappas, G.J. (2013). Stochastic game
approach for replay attack detection. In 2013 IEEE Conf.
Decision and Cont., 1854–1859.
Mo, Y., Weerakkody, S., and Sinopoli, B. (2015). Physical
authentication of control systems: designing watermarked
control inputs to detect counterfeit sensor outputs. IEEE
Control Systems, 35(1), 93–109.
Polyanskiy, Y. and Wu, Y. (2016). Lecture notes on information
theory.
Raginsky, M. (2010). Divergence-based characterization of
fundamental limitations of adaptive dynamical systems. In
2010 Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and
Computing, 107–114. IEEE.
Rantzer, A. (2018). Concentration bounds for single parameter
adaptive control. In 2018 American Cont. Conf. (ACC),
1862–1866. IEEE.
Sandberg, H., Amin, S., and Johansson, K.H. (2015). Cyber-
physical security in networked control systems: An introduc-
tion to the issue. IEEE Control Systems, 35(1), 20–23.
Sarkar, T. and Rakhlin, A. (2019). Near optimal finite time
identification of arbitrary linear dynamical systems. In Int.
Conf. on Machine Learning (ICML), 5610–5618.
Satchidanandan, B. and Kumar, P.R. (2017). Dynamic water-
marking: Active defense of networked cyber–physical sys-
tems. Proceedings of the IEEE, 105(2), 219–240.
Shi, D., Guo, Z., Johansson, K.H., and Shi, L. (2018). Causality
countermeasures for anomaly detection in cyber-physical
systems. IEEE Tran. Auto. Cont., 63(2), 386–401.
Shoukry, Y., Chong, M., Wakaiki, M., Nuzzo, P., Sangiovanni-
Vincentelli, A., Seshia, S.A., Hespanha, J.P., and Tabuada,
P. (2018). SMT-based observer design for cyber-physical
systems under sensor attacks. ACM Trans. on CPS, 2(1), 5.
Smith, R.S. (2011). A decoupled feedback structure for
covertly appropriating networked control systems. IFAC
Proceedings Volumes, 44(1), 90–95.
Tu, S. and Recht, B. (2018). Least-squares temporal difference
learning for the linear quadratic regulator. In Int. Conf. on
Machine Learning (ICML), 5005–5014.
Tunga, R., Murguia, C., and Ruths, J. (2018). Tuning windowed
chi-squared detectors for sensor attacks. In 2018 Annual
American Cont. Conf., 1752–1757. IEEE.
Urbina, D.I., Giraldo, J.A., Cardenas, A.A., Tippenhauer, N.O.,
Valente, J., Faisal, M., Ruths, J., Candell, R., and Sandberg,
H. (2016). Limiting the impact of stealthy attacks on in-
dustrial control systems. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Se-
curity, 1092–1105.
Weerakkody, S. and Sinopoli, B. (2015). Detecting integrity
attacks on control systems using a moving target approach.
In 2015 IEEE Conf. Decision and Cont. (CDC), 5820–5826.
Zhu, M. and Martı´nez, S. (2014). On the performance analysis
of resilient networked control systems under replay attacks.
IEEE Tran. Auto. Cont., 59(3), 804–808.
